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1 Introduction
On January 1st, 1999 Europe entered a new era with the adoption of a single
currency - the euro - by 11 of the European Union’s 15 member states. For
the first time since the Roman Empire, a large portion of Europe again
shares a common currency.1 The launch of the euro has created the world’s
second largest single currency area in terms of economic size after the Unites
States (Eijﬃnger and De Haan, 2000).
With the start of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), participating
countries no longer have their own monetary policy. The European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB) is responsible for monetary policy decisions in the euro
zone. The move toward EMU has been accompanied by extensive discussions
about asymmetries in monetary transmission across the euro zone countries.
Most of the evidence is based on Vector Auto Regressions (VARs). The con-
clusions of the various studies diﬀer markedly. Whereas, for instance, Barran
et al. (1996) only find small diﬀerences, Rawasmamy and Sloek (1997) and
Ehrmann (2000) report substantial diﬀerences in the impact of monetary
policy measures across countries in the euro area.
Amongst other things, the impact of monetary policy on the real economy
depends on how changes in policy rates are transmitted to market interest
rates. Two elements are crucial for the transmission of monetary policy
decisions: the speed and the degree to which changes in the policy rate
aﬀect the cost of borrowing. A well-known study by Cottarelli and Kourelis
(1994) on the pass through of monetary policy measures concludes that the
degree of stickiness of market rates is, on average, quite high and shows
considerable variation, especially in the short run, also in the countries in
the euro area.
The purpose of this paper is to examine how the pass through of monetary
policy measures in the six largest EMU countries (Belgium, Germany, Spain,
France, Italy, and The Netherlands) has evolved over time. The countries
in our sample cover most of the euro zone. We want to answer the question
whether or not the pass through has become more similar in these countries,
i.e. whether there is convergence in monetary transmission. This is an im-
portant issue. Some of the critics of EMU have argued that asymmetries in
monetary transmission across the countries in the euro area may seriously
1At the time of writing, three EU member states do not (yet) participate in EMU:
Denmark, the United Kingdom and Sweden (Greece participates in EMU since 2001).
Still, it is expected that at some time these countries will also use the euro, as will some
potential future EU member countries in Central and Eastern Europe.
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hamper the common monetary policy of the ECB (see e.g. Dornbusch et al.,
1998).
Most previous studies have focused on diﬀerences in pass through across
countries at a certain point in time. In contrast, we focus on the question of
whether diﬀerences in pass through across countries, if any, have increased
or decreased over time. Our estimation period is 1980-2000. For our pur-
pose, we first estimate the long-run relationship between money market and
lending rates using the FM-OLS estimator and test for parameter instability
following Hansen (1992). As these tests indicate that certain changes have
occurred over time, we then apply an Error Correction Model (ECM) with a
moving window in which the number of observations remains the same. For
each regression one observation at the beginning of the window is dropped
and one is added at the end of the window.
We conclude that diﬀerences in pass through exist in our sample, both in
terms of initial as well as long-run responses to policy-induced interest rate
changes. However, there is some (weak) evidence for convergence of mone-
tary policy transmission.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 oﬀers a brief
review of the literature. Section 3 presents our model and the data used,
while section 4 contains our estimation results. The final section oﬀers some
concluding comments.
2 Review of the literature
The theoretical and empirical literature on the pass through of monetary
policy measures has focused on three issues: 1. the theoretical explanation
of interest rate stickiness; 2. the degree of interest rate stickiness across
countries; and 3. the relationship between interest rate stickiness and finan-
cial structure. In this section we briefly review the relevant literature.
2.1 Interest rate stickiness: Theory
Lowe and Rohling (1992) point out that many of the explanations advanced
to explain price stickiness in goods markets are also applicable to finan-
cial markets. Following their approach, we may distinguish four theories:
agency costs (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), adjustment costs (Cottarelli and
Kourelis, 1994), switching costs (Klemperer, 1987), and risk sharing (Fried
and Howitt, 1980).
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Agency costs arise due to asymmetric information. Banks cannot distinguish
between risky and less risky projects. Consequently, an increase in the
costs of funding will not necessarily result in a proportionate increase in
the loan rate of banks. When the bank increases its loan rate, the firms
with the safest projects will be the first to withdraw from the market. As a
result, the mix of applicants applying for loans changes adversely (adverse
selection). Furthermore, firms may decide to undertake riskier projects due
to the higher interest rates (moral hazard). As the probability of default
would rise due to the higher interest rate, an increase in the loan rate will
not necessarily result in a proportionate increase in the bank’s expected
receipts. Banks may therefore prefer to set the loan rate below the market
clearing rate and ration credit.
Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) argue that the banking industry faces adjust-
ment costs when interest rates change. A profit-maximizing bank will only
change the lending rate if the adjustment costs are lower than the costs of
keeping lending rates unchanged. The cost of maintaining non-equilibrium
rates is positively related to the elasticity of the demand for bank loans. The
demand for bank loans is less elastic in markets that have fewer competitors,
higher barriers to entry or no alternative sources of finance, including foreign
capital. Finally, banks may not adjust their lending rates if they perceive
that the changes in the money market rates are only temporary.
Banks are concerned with the characteristics of their clients, like risk profile.
Unlike many other markets, in banking one client is not as good as the other.
To find out about the characteristics of clients is a costly activity for a bank
which is often passed on to the client in the form of a fee, which makes
it costly for a buyer to switch from one bank to another (switching costs).
As shown by Klemperer (1987) switching costs cause the derivative of price
with respect to marginal cost to be less than one (Lowe and Rohling, 1992).
Finally, risk sharing may explain interest rate stickiness. Fried and Howitt
(1980) argue that borrowers may be more risk averse than the shareholders
of a bank. As the borrower is risk averse, he prefers stable interest rate
payments. The bank therefore charges a less variable interest rate than its
marginal cost of funds for which it is compensated by a higher interest rate
(risk premium).
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Belgium Germany Spain France Italy Netherlands
Cottarelli and 21 37 36 - 12 52
Kourelis (1994) 87 100 94 - 83 82
Borio and 61 11 0 43 26 108
Fritz (1995) 127 105 117 74 122 108
BIS (1994) 85 18 - 43 14 125
Mojon (2000) 96 68 65 86 50 99
Table 1: Short-run and long-run eﬀect of policy rate increase of 100 basis-
points on lending rate (basispoints).
2.2 Interest rate stickiness across countries: Empirical evi-
dence for EMU countries
Various studies have investigated the pass through empirically in a multi-
country setting.2 Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) report important diﬀer-
ences in pass through in EMU countries. Table 1 shows their estimates of
the short-term (initial) and long-term eﬀect for the six countries which are
focused upon in the present study. Also the outcomes of similar studies by
Borio and Fritz (1995), BIS (1994) and Mojon (2000) are presented in this
table. Note that the first row shows the short-run eﬀect and the second
presents the long-run eﬀect. The BIS (1994) and Mojon (2000) studies only
report short-run multipliers. The short-run eﬀect refers to impact multipliers
for Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) and BIS (1994); to one-month multipliers
for Borio and Fritz (1995); and to three-month multipliers for Mojon (2000).
For the latter, we report the multipliers that refer to short-term loan rates.
Mojon (2000) examined the pass through in the same six EMU countries as
the present paper for the period 1979-1998 for a whole range of deposit and
credit rates (which can, however, not be fully compared across countries)
and confirms the conclusion of heterogeneity of previous studies. Finally,
Sander and Kleimeier (2001) provide evidence that the speed of adjustment
and the nature of the adjustment process itself diﬀer in the EMU countries.
Some of the empirical studies go in a similar direction as the present paper
2Moazzami (1999) compares lending rate stickiness in Canada and the US. He concludes
that the long-run multipliers in Canada and the US are not significantly smaller than unity,
suggesting that lending rates adjust fully to changes in the money market rates. However,
the impact eﬀects are larger in Canada than for the US. Some studies report evidence on
interest rate stickiness for just one country. For instance, Lowe and Rohling (1992) find
large diﬀerences in pass-through in Australia across diﬀerent types of loans. Cottarelli et
al. (1995) report evidence on interest rate stickiness for Italy.
5
in the sense that they examine short- and long-run multipliers for diﬀerent
subsample periods. For instance, Mojon (2000) analyses the pass through
for diﬀerent interest rate cycles and finds that the dispersion of countries
around the average pass through slightly decreases from the 1979-1988 cycle
to the 1988-1998 cycle. However, in spite of this evolution, Mojon (2000)
concludes that responses of retail bank rates to changes in the money market
rate remain heterogeneous across the countries of the euro area.
Recently, Hofmann (2002) has examined the pass through in France, Ger-
many, Italy and Spain over the period 1984-1998 using the Johansen coin-
tegration analysis. He concludes that an innovation to the money market
rate is fully passed through to short-term and long-term business loan rates
in the long run. In the short run the response of lending rates is rather
sluggish. From the perspective of the present paper, it is interesting that
Hofmann also finds that the significance of diﬀerences in pass through across
the countries vanishes within twelve months after the money market rate in-
novation.
2.3 Pass through and financial system
Although the EMU countries now share the same currency, their financial
systems show considerable diﬀerences. As pointed out by Mojon (2000), na-
tional segmentation in the retail banking industry may remain significant in
spite of EMU as retail banking involves heavy investments in brand names,
in a network of branches and in relationships with customers. Also diﬀer-
ences in regulation may cause retail banking markets to remain segmented
along national lines. Furthermore, diﬀerences in the balance sheet struc-
ture of households and firms will only gradually adjust to the new monetary
regime. As a consequence, the pass through from policy-controlled interest
rates to bank interest rates may remain country specific. This potential
source of asymmetry in monetary transmission is particularly relevant in
the euro area where bank rates are a key determinant of the cost of capital
and the yield on savings.
Various studies have examined the link between diﬀerences in pass through
and diverging financial structures. Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) obtain a
significant negative eﬀect of five financial structure variables on the pass
through: the absence of a money market for negotiable short-term instru-
ments, the volatility of the money market rate, constraints on international
capital movements, the existence of barriers to entry and the public owner-
ship of the banking system.
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Following Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), Mojon (2000) has estimated the
impact of financial structure on the pass through within a panel of 25 credit
market rates and 17 deposit rates in the six biggest EMU countries. He finds
that for both credit and deposit rates the volatility of the money market rate
reduces the pass through and that competition from direct finance increases
it.
Cottarelli et al. (1995) conclude that diﬀerences in the degree of lending
rate stickiness among Italian banks are to a large extent due to diﬀerences
in concentration of the local markets in which banks operate. Other relevant
factors are: the extent of securitization of banks’ liabilities, the form of the
loan, bank size and the banks’ ownership structure.
3 Data and methodology
An important diﬃculty in research like this, is to find interest rates that
are comparable across countries. The money market rate used refers to
the three-month interbank rate in the various countries. As the study of
the BIS (1994) shows that the response of the three months money market
rate to the oﬃcial monetary policy rate is nearly one for one, we use this
interest rate as proxy for the policy-determined interest rate (see also Sander
and Kleimeier, 2001).3 For the observations after the start of EMU the
three month euro interbank market rate has been used.4 The data for the
lending rate (short-term loans to enterprises) have been provided by the
ECB, except for Italy where we have used the lending rate as published in the
International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF, because the ECB data
set started only in 1989. The model is estimated using monthly data and the
estimation period is 1980:1-2000:1.5 The sample covers two complete interest
rate cycles. For a summary of the data and sources, see the Appendix.
Table 2 provides the correlation between (the level and the first diﬀerences
of) the money market rate with the lending rate.
3This is one of the diﬀerences with the study of Mojon (2000) who employed a whole
range of interest rates, which lack comparability. Furthermore, in contrast to Mojon
(2000), we focus on changes in pass-through over time.
4We have also used the T-bill rate for Italy, because according to Cottarelli et al. (1995,
p. 693), lending on the Italian interbank market was limited before the 1990s, and the
T-bill rate was the relevant reference rate then. The results are similar.
5For the lending rate the periods are 1983:8-1999:11 for Italy and 1984:4-2000:1 for
France.
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Money market rate Correlations







Table 2: Correlations between money market and lending rates.
As pointed out in the introduction, the purpose of this paper is to examine
whether or not the pass through from policy to bank lending rates has
become more similar over time in countries in the euro area, i.e. whether
there is convergence in monetary transmission. It is sometimes claimed that
convergence has occurred (or will occur). For instance, Suardi (2001, p.
19) argues that ”in the euro area one may expect a convergence towards a
fuller and more homogenous pass through from policy to bank lending rates.
This is because all countries share a same - on average less volatile - money
market rate, and it has been shown that the pass through from policy to
bank lending rates is inversely related to the volatility of the money market
rate.”
As shown in section 2, previous empirical research has not explicitly exam-
ined whether or not convergence over time has occurred, but focused on the
pass through for a certain estimation period. This led to the conclusion
that substantial diﬀerences exist across euro-zone countries. As our sample
period diﬀers from those of previous studies on pass through in the euro
area, we start with the widely used model of Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994).
The estimated model is
it = β0 + β1it−1 + β2mt + ...+ βn+2mt−n + ut (1)
where it denotes the lending rate in month t; mt is the money market rate
and ut is an error term.6 On the basis of the model (1), the following
multipliers can be calculated:7
• The impact multiplier: h0 = β2.
6As noted by Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), this specification and the resulting steady
state solution is consistent with a monopolistic competition model relating the loan rate
to the money market rate (i.e. to the exogenously given marginal costs of funds).
7See Stewart and Venieris (1978) for details.
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• The long-term multiplier: hl = 11−β1
!n
i=0 β2+i.
As previous studies focusing on diﬀerent sample periods came up with often
diverging parameter estimates, this suggests that the relationship between
money market and lending rates may not be stable over time. Therefore,
we first test for parameter instability in the long-run relationship between
money market and lending rates following Hansen (1992). In this, we use
the Fully Modified (FM-) OLS estimator of Phillips and Hansen (1990) to
take the cointegration relationship into account. The underlying idea of
cointegration is that non-stationary time series (such as interest rates) can
move apart in the short run, but will be brought back to an equilibrium
relation in the long run. As the parameter instability tests suggest that
the relationship between the money market and the lending rates is not
stable in all countries in our sample, we examine this relationship in more
detail using rolling regression techniques in an error correction framework.







βk∆mt−k + λet + ut
or alternatively







it−1 − %δmt−1&+ ut, (2)
where et denotes the residuals of the long-run (cointegration) equation; %δ is
the estimated long-run parameter. For our main purpose - i.e. to examine
whether convergence has occurred - we will first test for cointegration and
then estimate this model and apply rolling regressions. The idea behind
this approach is to take a fixed number of observations and to redo the
regressions, every time adding one observation at the end of the sample,
while dropping one at the beginning. The results should indicate whether the
monetary policy transmission has been stable over time in the country under
consideration. By comparing the development of the various parameters
across the countries in our sample, we can answer our question whether
convergence has occurred or not. We focus on the following parameters:
• β0, which is comparable to the impact multipliers in Cottarelli and
Kourelis (1994);
8See also Kleimeier and Sander (2000), Mojon (2000) and Sander and Kleimeier (2001).
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Lags h0 hl
Belgium 12 0.752 (0.033) 1.018 (0.085)
Germany 8 0.330 (0.029) 0.899 (0.056)
Spain 8 0.898 (0.031) 1.135 (0.054)
France 10 0.075 (0.053) 0.618 (0.132)
Italy 2 0.175 (0.036) 0.616 (0.061)
Netherlands 5 0.847 (0.048) 0.965 (0.056)
Table 3: Results for the Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) model for the full
sample period (standard errors in parenthesis).
• %δ: indicates the long-run equilibrium relationship between both inter-
est rates, which is comparable to the long-run multipliers in Cottareli
and Kourelis (1994);
• λ: shows the adjustment speed.
The following section presents our results.
4 Estimation results
As explained in the previous section, we start our empirical analysis with
the model of Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994). This is mainly done to check
whether our sample period leads to diﬀerent results than those of previous
studies. As ADF tests clearly indicate that we cannot reject the hypothesis
that the interest rates are I(1), the model is estimated in first diﬀerences.9
The second step is the selection of the number of lags to be included. We
have used Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) to determine the lag struc-
ture. Table 3 presents the multipliers for the lending rate. It clearly fol-
lows that there are substantial diﬀerences across countries with respect to
both the initial eﬀect of monetary policy and the long-term eﬀect of policy-
induced interest rate changes. This finding is in line with the conclusions of
previous studies.
As explained in the previous section, next we test for parameter stability
using the method suggested by Hansen (1992). These tests are superior to
more traditional tests for a break (like the Chow-test), as they test for vari-
ous sorts of parameter instability. For this purpose we first had to estimate
9We have also used other unit root tests, which led to the same conclusion.
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SupF MeanF Lc
Belgium 21.82 ∗∗∗ 9.97 ∗∗∗ 0.97 ∗∗∗
Germany 15.37 ∗∗ 10.52 ∗∗∗ 1.72 ∗∗∗
Spain 14.07 ∗∗ 3.89 ∗ 0.34
France 13.19 ∗∗ 3.51 0.23
Italy 28.63 ∗∗∗ 9.98 ∗∗∗ 1.20 ∗∗∗
Netherlands 8.41 5.05 ∗∗ 0.92 ∗∗∗
Table 4: Parameter stability tests of Hansen (1992). Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
denote significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 %, respectively.
the following model, using the fully modified OLS method of Philips and
Hansen (1990):
it = ϕ0 + ϕ1mt + ut.
The tests are joint tests on ϕ0 and ϕ1. All tests have a common nulhypothe-
sis, i.e. that the parameters are stable over time, but have various alternative
hypotheses. The tests are:
• SupF test of Quandt (1960), testing for a single structural break of
unknown timing;
• MeanF test, testing whether coeﬃcients are a random walk;
• Lc test, testing whether the coeﬃcients are a random walk with pa-
rameter variation being relatively constant throughout the sample.
The results are shown in Table 4.
It clearly follows from Table 4 that the hypothesis of parameter stability
has to be rejected for all countries. At first sight there seem to be some
diﬀerences across countries. In Belgium, Germany and Italy the parameters
are not stable as all test statistics are significantly diﬀerent from zero. In
Spain and France the tests suggest the presence of a single structural break,
while for The Netherlands the parameters seem to follow a random walk.
However, as noted by Hansen (1992), rejection of the null of constant pa-
rameters does not imply the particular alternative the test was designed to
detect. The only statically justified conclusion is that the standard model of
cointegration, including its implicit assumption of long-run stability of the





Belgium 2,2 0.723 (0.032) 0.905 (0.010) -0.080 (0.028)
Germany 6,4 0.309 (0.028) 0.710 (0.022) -0.001 (0.012)
Spain 3,2 0.864 (0.030) 1.018 (0.007) -0.281 (0.053)
France 4,6 0.085 (0.053) 0.895 (0.028) -0.060 (0.026)
Italy 2,3 0.189 (0.034) 1.008 (0.019) -0.103 (0.023)
Netherlands 4,6 0.879 (0.048) 1.027 (0.008) -0.248 (0.067)
Table 5: Results for the ECM for the full sample period (standard errors in
parenthesis).
Informative as these tests may be, they are joint tests on ϕ0 and ϕ1. In
other words, the parameter ϕ0 may be unstable. From our perspective,
the relevant parameter is ϕ1. The next step is therefore to estimate our
preferred ECM. As pointed out, we first have to test whether the interest
rates are cointegrated. It turns out that for the full sample period the
variables are often not cointegrated. This is in line with the outcome for the
Lc-test, which is a test of the null of cointegration against the alternative
of no cointegration (Hansen, 1992). However, in the subsamples as used
in the rolling regressions the variables are clearly cointegrated (full details
available in Toolsema et al., 2001). Consequently, we could employ the ECM
as described by (2). Like in the previous section, the optimal lag structure
(for ∆mt and ∆it) is determined using AIC for the full estimation period
and applying a maximum number of lags of six for both variables.
Table 5 shows the results for the full sample period. As before, there is clear
evidence that the pass through diﬀers substantially across the countries in
the euro area.
The rolling regressions of the ECM have been done with 84 and 60 months.
We only report the results for the 7 year period (the results for the 5 year
period are very similar and are available on request). Figures 1-3 show the
results.
Figure 1 shows that for most countries the impact multiplier is quite stable
in the rolling regressions. Only in The Netherlands the impact multiplier
decreases over time and moves towards the level of the impact multiplier in
France, Germany and Italy. The multipliers in Belgium and Spain remain
consistently above the multipliers in the other countries.
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Figure 3: Adjustment speed (λ) in the ECM model: rolling regressions.
countries moved towards similar levels. In other words, this evidence sug-
gests that there is convergence of long-term multipliers. This process is visi-
ble in windows which start at the end of the 1980s. Still, it also follows that
this convergence came after a period which showed some divergence. The
multipliers in France, Germany and Italy initially moved away from those
in Belgium, Italy and The Netherlands that all had fairly stable multipliers.
Finally, Figure 3 shows the speed of adjustment. It becomes clear that
the speed of adjustment is relatively stable over time in most countries,
except for The Netherlands, which initially had a very diverging speed of
adjustment. Although the speed of adjustment in the various countries has
become more similar over time, there remains quite some variation.
Including confidence intervals into the above figures makes them undeci-
pherable. As an illustration, we therefore present in Table 6 the estimation
results including standard errors for three of the windows used in the rolling





1985- 1989- 1993- 1985- 1989- 1993 - 1985 - 1989 - 1993-
1991 1995 1999 1991 1995 1999 1991 1995 1999
Belgium 0.94 0.83 0.83 1.28 0.90 0.96 -0.12 -0.12 -0.28
(0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06) (0.05) (0.10)
Germ any 0.18 0.34 0.20 0.76 0.52 0.84 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05
(0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05)
Spain 0.68 0.84 0.88 0.93 1.03 1.05 -0.25 -0.51 -0.34
(0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09)
France 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.48 0.75 0.85 -0.06 -0.32 -0.06
(0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.12) (0.05)
Italy 0.13 0.20 0.22 0.89 0.71 1.01 -0.08 -0.05 -0.17
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0 .030 (0.03)
N etherlands 1.06 0.52 0.35 1.04 1.04 1.10 -0.42 -0.12 -0.02
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.13) (0.08) (0.07)
Table 6: Results for the ECM for three selected windows of the rolling
regressions (standard errors in parenthesis). Note: the last window for Italy
covers 1992:11-1999:10 instead of 1993:1-1999:12.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have examined how the pass through of monetary policy
measures in 6 EMU countries has evolved over time and whether there is
convergence in monetary transmission. The countries included are: Bel-
gium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, and The Netherlands and the sample
period is 1980-2000. One potential objection to our analysis based on rolling
regressions is that it can be argued that the start of EMU implies a regime
shift and that, therefore, the Lucas critique applies. However, as Issing
(2001, p. 290) points out: ‘One should realize that, first, a long and gradual
process of monetary convergence has preceded the introduction of the new
currency, so that many of the adjustments may already have taken place.
Second, the eﬀect of the single currency on competition in goods, labor, and
financial markets follows previous structural changes such as the Single Mar-
ket Initiative, so that whatever structural change will take place is part of
an on-going process.’ Indeed, our results lend support to Issing’s view. We
conclude that although major diﬀerences in pass through exist in our sam-
ple, both for the initial and the long-run responses to policy-induced interest
rate changes, there is at least some evidence for convergence of monetary
15
policy transmission.
A Appendix: Data and Sources
We consider the six largest EMU countries: Belgium, Germany, Spain, France,
Italy, and The Netherlands and use monthly data for the period 1980:1-
2000:1 where possible. For Italy, the sample period is 1983:8-1999:11 and
for France it is 1984:4-2000:1.
The money market rate used refers to the three-month interbank rate.
Sources: BIS for Belgium, Germany, Spain, and France; Thomson Financial
Datastream for Italy; and Prebon/Yamane for The Netherlands. For the
observations after the start of EMU the three-month euro interbank market
rate has been used (source: DNB Financiële Markten). Data have kindly
been provided by Jan Kakes of the Dutch central bank.
For Italy we used the T-bill rate from the International Financial Statistics
(IFS) of the IMF as an alternative (results are not shown).
The data for the lending rate (short-term loans to enterprises) have been
provided by the ECB (source: National Retail Interest Rates), except for
Italy where we have used the lending rate as published in the International
Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF, because the ECB data set started only
in 1989.
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